China’s claim to dominate technology

• By Aravind Yelleri and Sadia Rahman

The triumph of critical technology has been strengthened in the 21st century as scientific and technological research efforts have multiplied in quantity and quality.

Microchips and related technological powers are enabling today’s tech titans to thrive.

Drivers of economic activity are fundamental determinants of growth and energy competition. Highly sophisticated microchips, which enable advanced computing, are fueling technological disputes between states that control resources, technologies and supplies and define the global semiconductor security architecture.

Unlike oil and gas, there are no alternatives to microchips. While many industrialized economies such as Taiwan, the US, South Korea and China are rapidly developing sophisticated semiconductor industries, their newer counterparts continue to rely on cheap and outdated technologies, giving them no advantage over their competitors but only time. A place to survive and capture.

The semiconductor industry counts on China’s technological superiority and is a sign of its power.

Many states recognize risks from China’s technological advances.

However, it is not the first country to climb the value chain using modern technologies and state-sponsored industrial espionage. Globalization accounts show how Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have used their innovation to revolutionize technology beyond East Asia.

This is possible because of these countries’ ancient divergent views on technology, while at the same time continuing the global spread of new technologies. Technological innovation not only plays a vital role in the economy and development of these states, but also plays a critical role in next-generation networks and digital technologies whose standards are globally accepted.

Different aspects of science and technology are characterized by the rise of spillover technologies and the proliferation of technologies that support human development. These factors are critical in the semiconductor industry, which has developed an extremely complex supply chain involving thousands of specialized companies worldwide for complex products, as well as uneven market requirements and demand balances around the world.

In retrospect, economic power combined with technological superiority led to the rise of nation-states. These parameters and historical precedents based on imperialism indicate that China’s development has been significantly hindered by its direct approach to the development of science and technology. This disruption is based on China’s compelling growth and its reluctance to redesign the global supply chain for sophisticated products. This directly shows China’s willingness to revise the rules of the international community to suit its national interests.

China sees technology as a source of power. Technological leadership in critical industrial processes fuels national economic power, which, in turn, leads to global political power.

While the dramatic shift in technological diplomacy is nothing new, the potential of China’s military-civilian industrial complex to serve as a source of advanced technology for China’s military is undeniable. Because most of China’s critical technologies are imported, China’s leadership has rushed to overcome these dependencies by developing the country’s electronics capabilities.

The semiconductor industry has become an arena where the battle lines have been redrawn and fiercely fought. The ubiquity of chips has led to the growth of the global industry. In contrast to such technological changes, the Japanese government in the mid-20th century was prepared to relinquish technological power to show a sense of protectionism in the pre-EU economic community of the US, UK and Europe.

Japanese technological innovation and penetration of American microchip markets increased America’s dependence on Japan. This feature contrasts the current situation where economic dependence and technological dominance give one country dominance, which can be viewed through the lens of changing political power dynamics.

New players like China have accelerated this competition.

Western chip technology is based on 19th century experimental science. The early development of semiconductor devices came from the thermionic valve industry. The partnership of these governments is coordinated and has not disrupted the global supply chain and has not turned violent.

China’s “geostrategic rise” reflected its intention to mass produce high technologies by providing subsidies, cheap loans, incentives for rationalization and incentives for research and development, and changing the education system to increase the number of technologically qualified Chinese people. Industry.

With the breadth of service markets, supporting semiconductor infrastructure, healthy downstream industries, and a large and steady supply of capital, Chinese companies are looking behind the scenes to cover rising development costs. With the rapid diffusion of high-tech know-how through its alliances with several multinational corporations and Tier 1 foundations, China is striving to close the gap. China is an example of domestic technology becoming a political resource for national governments.

As a result, China’s technological development is seen as a threat to its “security” from asymmetric power. China’s military concepts are conventional in nature and reproduce all kinds of power imbalances – economic, technological and political.

Today, the discussion about technology and its control is not only about intellectual property or business form, but also about its geopolitical character. China’s use of technology can be classified as more than “strictly scientific”.

Many political strategists have argued that state-led scientific activities could provide a breeding ground for gaining much-needed control over power and publicity. This seems true. The nature of competition has changed from guns and iron to smart inventions.

The wheels of innovation have always driven the modernization of nations, their military power, their war potential, and their desire for more power.

However, China’s industrial and technological prowess to dominate the world in semiconductors underscores another point of view: Is war performance the primary focus of nation-states for centuries?

The technological and material needs of war influenced China’s strategy and foreign affairs. The preoccupation with control over the microchip supply chain has given birth to a new form of techno-nationalism in China that is fueling its superpower ambitions. Creating incentives to manufacture U.S. semiconductors (CHIPS) and the Science Act may delay China’s leadership potential, but it is difficult to predict whether it will stop China altogether.

Aravind Yelery is an Associate Fellow at the Institute of China Studies in New Delhi. Sadia Rahman is a PhD candidate at National Chung Hsing University.